Theology and Science ISSN: 1474-6700 (Print) 1474-6719 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtas20 The Trinitarian Basis of Science John B. King Jr. To cite this article: John B. King Jr. (2017): The Trinitarian Basis of Science, Theology and Science, DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2016.1265220 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14746700.2016.1265220 Published online: 04 Jan 2017. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rtas20 Download by: [University of Newcastle, Australia] Date: 06 January 2017, At: 13:12 THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE, 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14746700.2016.1265220 The Trinitarian Basis of Science John B. King Jr. ABSTRACT KEYWORDS In this article, I argue that Trinitarian theology provides the transcendental ground for scientific method and epistemology. To this end, my argument unfolds in three steps. First, I set forth the Peircian triadic circuit as a philosophical description of scientific method. Second, I establish the generality of this Peircian description by showing that the triadic circuit constitutes a methodological invariant within the post-positivist philosophy of science. Finally, I show that the Trinity grounds the Peircian circuit and therewith scientific method and epistemology. Trinitarian theology; Science; Philosophy of science; Peirce; Van Til; Post-positivism Creative Mutual Interaction (CMI) is a methodological framework developed by Robert John Russell to describe the mutual interaction between theology and science.1 Within this framework there are five ways for science to affect theology and three ways for theology to affect science.2 In regard to these latter three, theology may: 1) provide philosophical assumptions essential to science; 2) be heuristically fruitful in the development of scientific models, or 3) provide criteria for scientific theory choice. In this paper, I focus upon the issue of philosophical assumptions and argue that Trinitarian theology grounds scientific method and epistemology. To this end, my argument unfolds in three steps. First, I set forth Charles Sanders Peirce’s view that scientific method is defined by a triadic circuit of abduction, deduction, and induction. Second, I then establish the generality of this Peircian description by showing that the Peircian circuit constitutes a methodological invariant within the postpositivist philosophy of science.3 Finally, I show that Trinitarian theology grounds the Peircian circuit and therewith scientific method and epistemology. The Peircian Triadic Circuit According to C.S. Peirce, thought is a biological process that arises from pragmatic, feedback-controlled action. While such action operates unconsciously at lower biological levels, it becomes conscious and self-reflexive in human beings, owing to the fact that human thought and action are semiotically mediated by language. As a result of this self-reflexivity, logic emerges as a higher level normative science which regulates the pragmatic use of signs.4 Consequently, while logic is not identical with the biological thought process, logic grows out of it due to the fact that human thought is both mediated by signs CONTACT John B. King Jr. kingking3@comcast.net © 2016 Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences 2 J. B. KING JR. and self-reflexive. Logic is thus a self-conscious, methodologically refined articulation of pragmatic, feedback-controlled action (the basic thought process). Stated differently, pragmatic action becomes methodologically explicit through logic since logic provides the normative criteria governing the pragmatic use of signs. For Peirce, therefore, logic derives from pragmatic action and governs it in turn. Although logic is distinct from the general biological thought process, it is nevertheless derived from it, analogous to it, and the norm thereof.5 Moreover, because logic derives from the depths of Life, it possesses an all-encompassing breadth. In this regard, logic provides the transdisciplinary methodological structure governing inference in all fields of inquiry. As such, it is equivalent to scientific method and is therefore the queen of the sciences.6 As shown in Figure 1(a), Peircian logic embodies three mental operations in the form of a triadic circuit. The reiteration of this circuit over time is represented as a hermeneutical spiral in Figure 1(b). In this circuit, abduction formulates a hypothesis; deduction derives predictions from the hypothesis through symbolic transformation, and induction compares these predictions to the world in order to provide environmental feedback upon the theory. If the predictions prove accurate, then the hypothesis may be tentatively accepted. By contrast, if the predictions prove inaccurate, one must formulate a new hypothesis and reiterate the loop. Peirce writes: Concerning the validity of Abductive inference, there is little to be said, although that little is pertinent to the problem we have in hand. Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be. Figure 1. The Peircian triadic circuit. THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE 3 Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is to be brought about. No reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I can discover; and it needs no reason, since it merely offers suggestions.7 As seen from Figure 1(a), the Peircian circuit integrates three mental operations together with their associated referential factors. In this regard, abduction is an imaginative operation which is purely subjective. By contrast, deduction is a discursive operation with reference to normative factors (such as logic and mathematics) which it uses in the representation and transformation of conceptual constructs.8 Finally, induction is a comparative operation with reference to objective factors which it uses to provide environmental feedback and control.9 As argued above, Peircian logic provides the transdisciplinary methodological structure governing all fields of inquiry since it derives from the general biological process of pragmatic, feedback-controlled action. For this reason, the Peircian circuit provides a general description of scientific method. In the following section, I will confirm this generality by showing that the Peircian circuit constitutes a methodological invariant within the postpositivist philosophy of science. Once I have established this generality, I will then argue that Trinitarian theology grounds the Peircian circuit and therewith scientific method and epistemology. The Post-positivist Philosophy of Science and the Peircian Circuit Having articulated a Peircian philosophy of science, it is now possible to attest the presence of the Peircian circuit within the post-positivist philosophy of science. To this end, I will examine the work of four philosophers of science in the present section, namely Karl Popper, W.V.O. Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos.10 From an exposition of their philosophies, I will show that the Peircian circuit constitutes a methodological invariant within the developing trajectory of the post-positivist philosophy of science.11 However, since post-positivism is a reaction against logical positivism, I will begin with the latter to contextualize my discussion of post-positivism. Logical Positivism Logical positivism developed in Vienna in the period between the two world wars and then held sway within the philosophy of science into the 1950s and 1960s. As a school of thought, it developed from a confluence of two philosophical streams: 1) the resident Viennese positivism as represented formerly by Ernst Mach and 2) the program of logical atomism imported from England via Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.12 As logical positivism developed, its program revolved around two related issues: 1) scientific methodology and 2) the criterion of demarcation by which empirical science could be distinguished from other endeavors such as metaphysics. In regard to method, logical positivism claimed that empirical science was based upon induction. Yet it tried to solve the problem of induction by using the advanced logical techniques which it had inherited from the logical atomists. In this regard, it held that language was “truth-functional.” This meant that the truth values of complex statements could be 4 J. B. KING JR. determined by logically integrating the truth values of their components. Thus, the positivists sought to analyze complex statements (molecular propositions) into their simpler components (atomic propositions), each of which could then be verified by direct experience. In this way, scientific statements could be analyzed into directly verifiable parts and then re-synthesized through logic to form a verified whole. Through this method, the positivists sought to bring deductive certainty to the problem of induction by building upward from directly verified protocol statements. In addition to constituting the epistemological bedrock, verification was also used as the criterion of demarcation to distinguish the empirical and/or logical sciences from other fields like metaphysics. Following Hume, the logical positivists held that only logical or factual statements were meaningful.13 They therefore argued that a statement must be logically or empirically verifiable to be meaningful. Hence, the slogan for the verification principle became: “The meaning of a statement is its method of verification.” For the logical positivists, therefore, metaphysical statements were not merely bad philosophy (idle speculation) but pseudo-philosophy (totally meaningless).14 While the ostensible purpose of such demarcation was to distinguish science from metaphysics, its covert purpose was to annihilate metaphysics altogether as meaningless.15 However, since science is inspired and guided by metaphysical assumptions (such as an ordered universe, for instance), the positivist attempt to annihilate metaphysics was ultimately unscientific. Karl Popper Karl Popper broke from the ranks of logical positivism by proposing a new methodology for the empirical sciences as well as a new criterion of demarcation, both based upon the notion of “falsification.” According to Popper, induction is uncertain because a universal statement can never be conclusively verified by supporting instances.16 Yet, a universal statement can be falsified by a single counter instance. Falsification is thus the one route by which deductive certainty flows in the inductive direction.17 According to Popper, theories are originally generated through an irrational process which is similar to Peircian abduction (my words, not Popper’s) in that it combines features of creativity, intuition, and love. However, Popper differentiates this psychological genesis of theories from their subsequent logical testing. With regard to testing, Popper argues that conclusions must be logically deduced from the hypothesis and then compared to empirical observation statements. Since these latter two steps are equivalent to the Peircian steps of deduction and induction, Popper’s methodology is equivalent to the Peircian triadic circuit. According to the view that will be put forward here, the method of critically testing theories, and selecting them according to the results of tests, always proceeds on the following lines. From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you will—conclusions are drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions are then compared with one another and with other relevant statements so as to find what logical relations (such as equivalence, derivability, compatibility, or incompatibility) exist between them. … And finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it. THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE 5 … Next we seek a decision as regards these (and other derived statements) by comparing them with the results of practical applications and experiments. If this decision is positive, that is, if the singular conclusions turn out to be acceptable, or verified, then the theory has, for the time being, passed its test: we have found no reason to discard it. But if the decision is negative, or in other words, if the conclusions have been falsified, then their falsification also falsifies the theory from which they were logically deduced. It should be noticed that a positive decision can only temporarily support the theory, for subsequent negative decisions may always overthrow it. So long as the theory withstands detailed and severe tests and is not superseded by another theory in the course of scientific progress, we may say that it has “proved its mettle” or that it is “corroborated” by past experience. Nothing resembling inductive logic appears in the procedure here outlined. I never assume that we can argue from the truth of singular statements to the truth of theories. I never assume that by force of “verified” conclusions, theories can be established as “true,” or even as merely “probable.”18 As seen from Popper’s discussion, scientific theories are chosen by a survival of the fittest in terms of their agreement or lack thereof with observation statements.19 Within this program, falsified theories must be modified or discarded, necessitating additional iterations of the triadic circuit. Moreover, Popper holds that falsifiability presupposes internal coherence since unambiguous, falsifiable statements can only be derived from coherent systems.20 In regard to demarcation, Popper considers falsification rather than verification to be the criterion which distinguishes the empirical sciences from other fields of knowledge such as metaphysics. Moreover, since science depends upon metaphysics, he does not regard this latter field as meaningless, but simply as distinct from science. Finally, Popper argues that science is characterized primarily by its method, not its systematic form, and this method follows from the definition of empirical science and hence from falsification as the criterion of demarcation.21 To count as empirical science, therefore, a theory must be falsifiable. Willard Van Orman Quine Another philosopher to break from the ranks of logical positivism was Willard Van Orman Quine. In his seminal article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine set forth a theory of epistemological holism and used this theory to attack two dogmas of empiricism, namely 1) the analytic-synthetic distinction and 2) empirical reductionism.22 To see these implications, I will begin the discussion by quoting extensively from Quine. The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions re-adjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections—the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having re-evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, which may be statements logically connected with the first or may be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary 6 J. B. KING JR. conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole. If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement—especially if it is a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system … Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics … .23 As seen above, Quine regards human knowledge as a “man-made fabric” or a “field of force” which “impinges on experience only along the edges.” Moreover, experiential conflicts at the boundary occasion adjustments throughout the field due to its interconnectedness. Under conditions of extreme conflict, however, such adjustments may even affect the laws of logic as had already happened in response to quantum phenomena. Consequently, since even logic is affected by experience, there is no qualitative distinction between analytic (logical) and synthetic (empirical) statements but only a quantitative distinction of degree. After all, in extreme cases, “analytic” statements are synthetically affected by experience. Moreover, since experience is incorporated by readjustments within the larger field, “synthetic” statements are partially determined by their analytic connections to other statements. Contra positivism, therefore, scientific knowledge cannot be reduced to an empirical basis and verified therefrom. Quine’s holism therefore militates against the analytic-synthetic distinction, empirical reductionism, and hence the positivist verification principle. Quine’s holism also has implications for falsification. In this regard, Quine complicates falsification as envisioned by Karl Popper. Because a scientific theory stands together with several auxiliary hypotheses, the theory faces the data as part of a network, not by itself alone. Thus, falsification is rendered more complex since further testing is now required to determine whether a given problem lies with an auxiliary hypothesis or with the theory itself. In regard to method, Quine’s discussion manifests the latent presence of the Peircian triadic circuit. In this regard, recalcitrant experience at the boundary (induction) occasions readjustments in the interior of the field (abduction) and the systematic modification of other statements logically connected to these (deduction), etc. Presumably this cycle is reiterated until a new equilibrium is attained. Interestingly, Quine regards this process of adjustment as “pragmatic” because it is governed by considerations of conservatism and simplicity.24 However, this process is also pragmatic in another sense. Since abandoning the two dogmas of empiricism blurs the “supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science,”25 the positivist verification principle is undermined. Thus, unlike the positivists, Quine allows for pragmatic metaphysical posits such as atoms which simplify theory and make it workable.26 Science can therefore employ useful fictions in its continual process of adjustment since it is undetermined by experience and therefore never gets to reality as it is. THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE 7 Thomas Kuhn In the work of Thomas Kuhn, we see the effects of the linguistic turn upon the post-positivist philosophy of science. For Kuhn, the basic unit of scientific research is the paradigm which consists of the theory together with model problems that illustrate its application. Since scientific paradigms are socially inculcated through the process of scientific education, they are deeply ingrained and are not abandoned lightly. Moreover, since they provide the lens through which one views a particular slice of reality, they are seldom directly examined any more than one examines the glasses through which one views the world. In fact, as miniature worldviews, paradigms often evade questioning since they determine the very standards of questioning and proof. Consequently, since a distinct standard of proof is internal to each paradigm, there is no rational way of adjudicating between competing paradigms on the basis of a common standard. In contrast to Popper, therefore, Kuhn emphasizes the epistemological radicality of scientific theories. For Kuhn, theories are like languages since they exert a formative, socially constructed influence upon one’s thought. In fact, Kuhn acknowledged this linguistic analogy by mentioning his intellectual debt to the American linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf.27 In collaboration with Edward Sapir, Benjamin Lee Whorf developed the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which posits the linguistic determination of thought (linguistic radicality) and hence cultural relativity (epistemic incommensurability). This hypothesis is therefore the basis for the Kuhnian notion that competing theories are incommensurable.28 On the basis of this linguistic model, Kuhn attacked Popper’s epistemological objectivity. Popper had assumed that theories could be falsified against the benchmark of objective data without considering the role that theories play in the interpretation and construction of the data. For Kuhn, however, theory and data are interdependent because the theoretical framework provides the lens through which the data are perceived and interpreted. Thus, the data are theory laden because the theory is epistemologically prior to the data. Yet, the theory is also data laden since the data are ontologically prior to the theory. For Kuhn, therefore, the relationship between data and theory is one of hermeneutical interdependence, not linear reductionism. Given this interdependence, falsification is possible, yet extremely difficult. Because the data are ontologically prior to the theory, an accumulation of anomalies will eventually falsify the theory. However, because the theory is epistemologically prior to the data, these anomalies cannot initially be recognized for what they are. Additionally, given the epistemological priority of the theory, falsification produces a qualitative break in the scientific tradition that transforms both the theory and the data. Falsification is therefore difficult to achieve because it demands a revolutionary break with a past way of structuring reality. … Those theories, of course, do “fit the facts,” but only by transforming previously accessible information into facts that, for the preceding paradigm, had not existed at all. And that means that theories too do not evolve piecemeal to fit facts that were there all the time. Rather, they emerge together with the facts they fit from a revolutionary reformulation of the preceding scientific tradition, a tradition within which the knowledge-mediated relationship between the scientist and nature was not quite the same.29 Because paradigm shifts have such radical epistemological implications, scientific progress is hard to define. During normal science, a dominant paradigm holds sway. In this 8 J. B. KING JR. regime, progress is quantitative and continuous. However, a scientific revolution entails a paradigm shift which produces a discontinuous and qualitative break in the scientific tradition. As a result, the pre- and post-revolutionary phases of a tradition differ in kind and therefore become theoretically and factually “incommensurable” with one another.30 Presumably, the new paradigm integrates more data with greater economy, but because it is incommensurable with the older tradition, it cannot be said to bring one closer to the truth. These last paragraphs point the directions in which I believe a more refined solution of the problem of progress in the sciences must be sought. Perhaps they indicate that scientific progress is not quite what we had taken it to be. But they simultaneously show that a sort of progress will inevitably characterize the scientific enterprise so long as such an enterprise survives. In the sciences there need not be progress of another sort. We may, to be more precise, have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth.31 Despite Kuhn’s conceptual anti-realism, his theory of scientific revolutions embodies the implicit logic of the Peircian circuit. Although scientific knowledge is socially constructed in its epistemological aspect, data retain their ontological independence and priority. Thus, falsification is still possible but requires a revolution. In these revolutions, pervasive anomalies (induction) occasion creative reformulations of the paradigm (abduction) whose implications are then worked out systematically (deduction) and compared to the data again (induction), etc. A Kuhnian revolution therefore conforms to the logic of the Peircian circuit. Imre Lakatos Imre Lakatos was a colleague of Karl Popper who was influenced by both Popper and Kuhn. Because he was philosophically closer to Popper than to Kuhn, he could not accept the radicality of Kuhn’s position which seemed to make scientific progress impossible. Yet, he perceived truth in Kuhn’s notion of the theory-ladenness of data and the theory’s consequent resistance to falsification. Accordingly, Lakatos sought to synthesize Popper with Kuhn in order to rescue Popper’s program of falsification.32 To this end, he adopted the research program as the basic unit of scientific research, thereby displacing the Kuhnian paradigm. According to Lakatos, scientific endeavors consist of research programs which are historically extended and socially embodied.33 Such programs coalesce around a central theory called the hard core and protect this theoretical core through an outer ring of auxiliary hypotheses called the protective belt. The function of the protective belt is twofold. First, it provides the subsidiary theories needed to relate the hard core to the experimental data. Second, in the event of a mismatch between the data and the theory, the anomaly can be rectified by modifying the protective belt rather than the hard core. Thus, the belt protects the core by absorbing anomalies and giving way preferentially in lieu of the core. This strategy of directing anomalies against the belt rather than the core is called the negative heuristic. By contrast, the positive heuristic consists of the envisioned experimental and theoretical program which is designed to extend the robustness of the core hypothesis. Since the hard core defines the research program, it is equivalent to a Kuhnian paradigm. Thus, a change in the hard core would imply a change in the research program. THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE 9 So understood, the negative heuristic incorporates the Kuhnian resistance to falsification since anomalies are directed against the protective belt in an attempt to save the core. With regard to changes in the belt, the research program is said to be progressive if the new auxiliary hypotheses allow for the prediction and discovery of previously unforeseen phenomena in addition to rectifying the original anomaly. On the other hand, when these changes yield nothing beyond the rectification of the offending anomaly, such changes are referred to as ad hoc, and the research program is said to be degenerating. Consequently, while a research program can always resist falsification through ad hoc moves, a continual dependence upon such moves indicates that a research program is degenerating. Such degeneration will cause scientists to switch to a progressive research program since progressive programs are preferred. This Lakatosian switch is equivalent to both a Kuhnian revolution and Popperian falsification. As seen from this description, Lakatos synthesizes Kuhn with Popper by envisioning falsification on two levels. In regard to the protective belt, falsification proceeds readily in accordance with the logic of Karl Popper. In regard to the hard core, however, falsification is resisted and therefore proceeds more slowly in accordance with the logic of Thomas Kuhn. Finally, since Lakatos spoke of modifying auxiliary hypotheses (abduction), deducing their consequences (deduction), and comparing them to new data (induction), his method implicitly embodies the Peircian circuit. Thus, the two levels of falsification discussed above can be represented in Peircian terms as shown in Figure 2. Here, Figure 2(a) represents the Peircian triadic circuit; Figure 2(b) represents its diachronic extension for modifications of the protective belt, and Figure 2(c) represents its diachronic extension Figure 2. Lakatosian research program in synchronic and diachronic perspective. 10 J. B. KING JR. for a change in the hard core. As seen from this figure, therefore the diachronic extension of a Lakatosian research program can be represented as a spiral iteration of the triadic circuit with a change of axis denoting a change in the research program (i.e. the hard core). Summary On the basis of the preceding discussion, the Peircian circuit is seen to be a methodological invariant within the post-positivist philosophy of science. This invariance establishes the generality of the Peircian circuit as a philosophical description of scientific method. Despite its ubiquity, however, there are implicit differences in its interpretation. At one extreme, Peirce was a realist who believed that science would ultimately converge with the real in an eschatological consensus of the scientific community. On the other hand, Thomas Kuhn was a conceptual anti-realist who denied theoretical correspondence with reality and thus scientific progress as well. Despite these differences, however, all these philosophers implicitly assume that the Peircian circuit defines a method which is capable of generating theories of increasing robustness and parsimony. Yet, since this assumption constitutes a metaphysical boundary condition for both science and the philosophy of science, neither discipline can justify it on the basis of its own conceptual resources. Accordingly, we now turn to Trinitarian theology to ground the Peircian circuit and therewith scientific method and epistemology. The Trinity and the Peircian Circuit To ground the Peircian circuit theologically, I will use the Trinitarian theology of the Reformed apologist Cornelius Van Til. Although Van Til is not well known, his work was innovative in setting forth the epistemological implications of classical Trinitarian theology. As applied to the present problem, Van Til’s epistemology sets forth the Trinity as the transcendental ground of the Peircian circuit and thus of scientific epistemology in general.34 To make this case, I will consider three interrelated aspects of Van Til’s theology. First, God’s triune nature establishes Him as an absolute person who is capable of creating and sustaining the universe.35 Second, because God is both one and three, He is the common source of both the unity and the diversity of the created order. Finally, because the Holy Spirit envelopes and permeates the entire creation, the Trinity establishes an exhaustively personal context for human knowledge through the medium of the Holy Spirit. The Creator as an Absolute Person According to Van Til, God’s triune nature establishes His absolute personality and thus His capacity to create the universe. In this regard, the central issue is the problem of correlativity. If the Infinite is limited by the finite, the two become correlative and thus interdependent. This problem was previously recognized by Hegel. For Hegel, such correlativity produces a bad Infinity because the limitation and interdependence of the Infinite renders it finite. Hegel’s solution to this problem was for the Infinite to incorporate the finite into itself. THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE 11 Unlike Hegel, however, Van Til solved the problem of correlativity in a classically Trinitarian way. Van Til’s approach was to say that the Trinitarian persons are internally correlative to each other apart from creation and thus not externally correlative with the world. As a triune community of persons, God has personal relation and hence personal opposition within His own being. He is therefore exhaustively correlative within Himself “prior to” and apart from creation. Accordingly, He does not compromise His aseity or His personality by defining Himself correlative to a finite, impersonal world. In other words, it is precisely due to God’s personal relationality that He is in no way dependent upon creation since His internal correlativity eliminates the need for external correlativity. God is therefore absolute (not externally correlative) because He is personal (internally and personally correlative) and personal because He is absolute. Thus, the internal correlativity of God’s triune personality undergirds His aseity and therewith His transcendence over the created order. We may express this thought philosophically by saying that for us the eternal one and many form a self-complete unity. God is absolute personality and therefore absolute individuality. He exists necessarily. He has no non-being over against himself in comparison with which he defines himself; he is internally self-defined. Using the language of the One-and-Many question we contend that in God the one and the many are equally ultimate. Unity in God is no more fundamental than diversity, and diversity in God is no more fundamental than unity. The persons of the Trinity are mutually exhaustive of one another. The Son and the Spirit are ontologically on a par with the Father.36 God exists in himself as a triune self-consciously active being. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are each a personality and together constitute the exhaustively personal God. There is an eternal, internal self-conscious interaction between the three persons of the Godhead. They are co-substantial. Each is as much God as are the other two. The Son and the Spirit do not derive their being from the Father. The diversity and the unity in the Godhead are therefore equally ultimate; they are exhaustively correlative to one another and not correlative to anything else.37 As seen above, God’s triune nature establishes His absolute personality and therewith His transcendence over the created order. On the basis of His triune nature, therefore, God is a se and thus infinite in being, knowledge, and power. As a result, God knows and controls His own being and all created being by extension. For God, therefore, the real is the rational, and the rational is the real.38 Creation is thus planned, executed, and known by an exhaustively personal God. The Creator as the Source of Unity and Diversity For Van Til, God is not only a se. He is also the source of both unity and diversity because He is eternally one and eternally three. Thus, just as the ultimate One-and-Many interrelate within God’s being, so the derivative one-and-many interrelate within the created order. Because God interweaves the unity and diversity of creation, He establishes both the diversity of the Peircian operations as well as their unity within a common process. It is this reconciled unity and diversity that makes the Peircian circuit productive for human knowledge. To see this point more clearly, let us contrast the Trinitarian approach with a Buddhist approach to the same problem. In response to the Vedantic philosophers of India, the 12 J. B. KING JR. Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu argued that the world’s diversity cannot result from an ultimate unity.39 This argument was expanded by the Buddhist logician Dharmakirti. However, in making their case, the Buddhist logicians so championed the diversity of the world that they denied its unity. Thus, these Buddhist philosophers could not embrace a reality characterized by interdependent unity and diversity. For the Christian, however, this is not a problem because the interdependent unity and diversity of the created order derives from the ultimate unity and diversity of God. The Creator as a Cosmically Personal Environment For Van Til, Trinitarian theology also supports science by establishing a cosmic personalism as the environing context for human knowledge. In this regard, the Holy Spirit becomes the personal medium who permeates, envelops, and interweaves the structures of creation. However, since the personal identity of the Holy Spirit is itself defined through His relationships with the Father and the Son, the entire Trinity enters into the personal mediation of the Holy Spirit. Consequently, personal knowledge is possible because science operates against the background of the entire Trinity and thus within a cosmically personal environment. In regard to the Peircian circuit, the Holy Spirit ties its three operations together and also establishes the personal nature of each one. After all, as the all-encompassing personal medium, the Holy Spirit establishes the human personality and thus the personal quality of each Peircian operation. Moreover, He also interweaves the Peircian operations so that they are integrated into a unity. As a result, the correspondence between them is environmentally sustained and not the result of a deistically orchestrated occasionalism. In this manner, the Holy Spirit ensures that scientific knowledge is personal, coherent, and thus possible. … It were quite legitimate and true to say that the foundation of all personal activity among men must be based upon the personality of one ultimate person, namely, the person of God, if only it be understood that this ultimate personality of God is a triune personality. In the Trinity there is completely personal relationship without residue. And for that reason it may be said that man’s actions are all personal too. Man’s surroundings are shot through with personality because all things are related to the infinitely personal God … .40 Summary In this section, I have presented a threefold argument to support my contention that the Trinity constitutes the transcendental ground of science. First, because God is triune, He is an absolute person and thus the creator of the universe. Second, because He is eternally one and eternally three, He is the source of both temporal unity and temporal diversity. Finally, as the cosmically personal environment, God weaves the three Peircian operations into a unity and also establishes the personal quality of each one. Thus, it is precisely because God is triune that the Peircian operations generate scientific theories of increasing robustness and parsimony. Conclusion In this article, I have argued that Trinitarian theology provides the transcendental ground for scientific method and epistemology. In making this case, my argument has unfolded in THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE 13 three steps. First, I set forth the Peircian circuit as a philosophical description of scientific method. Second, I established the generality of this description by showing that the Peircian circuit constitutes a methodological invariant within the post-positivist philosophy of science. Finally, I showed that the Trinity grounds the Peircian circuit and thus scientific method and epistemology. Because the Trinitarian position is unique to Christianity, the above argument is well suited for the interreligious discussion of theology (or Buddhist philosophy) and science. Unlike a generically theistic argument, a specifically Trinitarian argument defines the Christian position precisely. Moreover, since the above conclusions hold for both Eastern and Western Trinitarian models, these epistemological conclusions hold for Christianity as a whole. Consequently, on the issues of scientific method and epistemology, my argument positions Christianity at a single location within a contested interreligious field. Notes 1. For a description of Creative Mutual Interaction, please see Robert John Russell, Cosmology from Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of Theology and Science (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 1–24. 2. Ibid., 319–321. 3. For a discussion of the post-positivist philosophy of science, see John H. Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). 4. Charles Sanders Peirce, “Minute Logic,” in James Hoopes, ed., Peirce on Signs (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 231, 232. 5. Charles Sanders Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” in Peirce on Signs, 57, 58. 6. Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (vols. 1–6) and by Arthur Burks (vols. 7–8), 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931–1958), VII, 45–47. This reference has standard numbering by volume and paragraph. Thus, the reference here is to volume VII, paragraphs 45–47. 7. Ibid., V, 171. 8. Note that logic and mathematics have reference to social convention since they are dependent upon the social phenomenon of language. However, this is not to say that logic and mathematics are merely social constructs. 9. Despite these referential differences, each operation is mental. 10. In my ThD dissertation, I also included N.R. Hanson and David Bloor in my examination of the post-positivist philosophy of science. For an exposition of their philosophies, please see John B. King, “The One, the Many, and the Philosophy of Science: A Comparison of Trinitarian and Buddhist Epistemologies” (ThD Dissertation, Graduate Theological Union, 2015), ch. 4. 11. In regard to the above philosophers, it is necessary to clarify the use of the label “post-positivist.” A large strand of Continental postmodernity is post-structuralist. By contrast, AngloAmerican postmodernity is post-positivist because it reacts against positivism rather than structuralism. However, “post-positivism” is a broader term than “postmodernity” because it includes modern thinkers like Popper who were reacting against positivism prior to the linguistic turn. Thus, Popper is definitely post-positivist but not postmodern. 12. J.O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis: Its Development Between the Two World Wars (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 103–107. 13. Ibid., 116, 127. 14. Ibid., 102, 103. 15. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Routledge, 2002), 12–14. 14 J. B. KING JR. 16. Note that in opposing the logical positivist concept of induction as the method of empirical science, Popper is not opposing induction in the Peircian sense as the comparison of theoretical predictions with observation statements. Indeed, falsification is based upon such comparisons. Popper avoids the word “induction” due to its positivist ring. 17. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 19, 20. 18. Ibid., 9, 10. 19. Ibid., 91. 20. Ibid., 72. 21. Ibid., 28, 34. 22. In this regard, analytic statements are statements of logic alone which are held to be eternally true regardless of experience. By contrast, synthetic statements are statements of fact which are empirically determined by experience. 23. W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View, ed. W.V.O. Quine (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 42, 43. 24. Ibid., 46. 25. Ibid., 20. 26. Ibid., 44, 45. 27. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), vi. 28. For information on Whorf’s views see Benjamin Lee Whorf, “Science and Linguistics,” in Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. John B. Carol (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1956), 212–214. 29. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 141. 30. For instance, in the Copernican Revolution, the change from a geocentric to a heliocentric paradigm resulted in a corresponding change from geocentric to heliocentric facts. 31. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 170. 32. Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes, 94, 95. The synthesis of Popper and Kuhn is evident in Lakatos’ statement that a research program is an objective, “third world” reconstruction of Kuhn’s socio-psychological concept of the paradigm. Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes, 103. 33. Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 34. Although Van Til never examined the Peircian circuit per se, his Trinitarian epistemology clearly implies that the triune God is its transcendental ground. Consequently, in making this case, I am applying Van Til’s epistemology to a new problem while preserving the transcendental structure of his Trinitarian thought. 35. As an evangelical Christian, I use traditional language for God as warranted by scripture and the catholic tradition. 36. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1967), 25, 26. 37. Cornelius Van Til, Apologetics (Philipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), 8. 38. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 36, 37. 39. Richard Hayes, “Principled Atheism in the Buddhist Scholastic Tradition,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988), 11. Hayes argues that Buddhists invariably rejected any notion of a “unity that is composed of a plurality of components.” To underscore this point, he then adds: “To give an exhaustive account of all the occurrences of the Buddhist treatment of the one-many problem would be to tell nearly the whole story of Indian Buddhist philosophy, which is a bit like a symphony played on a one-stringed violin.” Hayes, 20. 40. Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969), 78. THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE 15 Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Notes on contributor John B. King Jr. is an independent scholar and freelance writer from Corvallis, OR. He earned a PhD in Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering from Oregon State University as well as a ThD from the Graduate Theological Union and a DMin from George Fox Evangelical Seminary. He is currently in the process of becoming a pastor in the North American Lutheran Church (NALC).